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Since the mid-1970s, all land in Ethiopia has offi cially been declared as a public/state 
property.  Consequently, peasants have enjoyed only land use rights, while land sale 
has been deemed illegal.  Indeed, the government legislation is not the only factor to 
have constrained land sale in the study area.  The Arsii Oromo customs too discourage 
the transfer of land to ‘outsiders.’  Nevertheless, neither government legislation nor the 
local customs have exercised an absolute control over land sale, and small-scale land 
transactions have existed under various disguises.  Although most of the land sale, 
being an illicit practice, is conducted through oral agreements, some land transactions 
involve informal written papers.  At a glance these written materials appear to be 
attempts to ‘formalize’ an informal activity.  Closer examination, however, reveals 
how some important words are carefully avoided, and other words and concepts with 
ambiguous or dual meanings are being deliberately employed in these written deals.  
These disguises and ambiguities introduced into the written agreements demonstrate 
farmers’ ‘adaptive strategies’ (adaptation both to the policies/legislation, and to the 
local customs as well) in order to conduct land transactions.  Detailed analysis of these 
informal recordings is the core focus of this paper.
1. Introduction
In Ethiopia, the land issue constitutes one of the most contentious issues as it involves confl icting 
political, economic and socio-cultural interests.  Land has been a key factor in the making 
of Ethiopia’s political economy.  In Ethiopia’s history land has always been a major base of 
livelihoods for the majority; was transferred as a gift; served in lieu of salary; was snatched from 
those who fell out with political regimes (as a punishment which alienated the dispossessed); 
and was given as a reward to those who demonstrated allegiance to the political regimes.  Land 
issues, therefore, have played key roles in the survival or demise of political regimes.  Land was 
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one of the top issues that contributed to the collapse of the imperial regime, and was a factor in 
the support earned by the military regime that succeeded it in the mid-1970’s Ethiopia.  In these 
ways, land has been and remains both a centripetal and centrifugal force in Ethiopia’s political 
economy.
The role of land in the present political economy of the country remains tremendous.  The 
power of land in infl uencing Ethiopia’s political future was vividly observed during campaigns 
for the May 2005 election.  Land topped the key contesting issues between the ruling and 
opposition parties.  The present subject of contestation is whether to privatize the land or to 
maintain the current public/state ownership.  In essence, these debates are over whether or 
not to allow the sale of land.  Those who argue in favor of land privatization believe that land 
sale would promote economic development as it would transfer the land to those who have 
the means to put it under effective use, serve as collateral for landowners to get access to bank 
loans, promote the conservation of the land, and improve security for investment [e.g., Nega 
2003; Gesesse 2003].  The government and those who support its land policy, on the other hand, 
maintain that land privatization would create uncontrollable land speculation, which would in 
turn lead to the dispossession of the desperate rural masses.  This would in turn, the government 
believes, create a mass of unemployed and unemployable people fl ooding the already overstressed 
urban centers [e.g., PANA 2000; Jemma 2001; Ogbolu 2005].
There are two assumptions that these dichotomous arguments explicitly or implicitly 
advance.  From the point of view of those who advocate land privatization, the assumption 
might be that the mere privatization of the land and the subsequent legislation to enforce it are 
all that are needed so that land could easily be transferred into the hands of those that could 
make good use of it.  The government, on the other hand, assumes that if land is privatized, 
people could easily be taken advantage of by greedy land speculators.  In order to avoid this, 
and any land sale for that matter, the state should hold the land as a trustee of the people, 
and government legislation should prohibit the sale of land.  These assumptions, although 
they appear different, have one thing in common.  Both tend to assume peasants to be passive 
receivers of what is decided at higher levels.
My aim in this paper, however, is not to argue one or the other assertions explained 
above.  It is rather to examine whether privatizing land would actually accelerate land sale or 
maintaining state ownership of land can totally bar the practice.  My argument is that both 
could only be partially successful, as there are other factors, beyond government legislation, that 
infl uence the trend towards land sale or otherwise.  The presence of disguised land sale, however 
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small the scale may be, under the present policies that bar any form of land sale and the power 
of kin groups in infl uencing land sale practices constitute the basis for this argument, as I shall 
demonstrate in the subsequent discussion.
Currently land sale is constrained by two forces.  One is external and the other is internal 
to the landholders.  The external force is government legislation that prohibits any form of 
land transaction, except for contracting out the land for a specifi ed period of time.  Article 40 
(3) of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution declares that, “The right to ownership of rural and 
urban land...is exclusively vested in the State...and land shall not be subject to sale or another 
means of exchange” [FDRE 1995].  This was later on made into law by the Federal Rural Land 
Administration Proclamation of 1997 which made land sale illegal [FDRE 1997].
Land sale is discouraged by Oromo customs as well [Hebo 2006: 37; Tolera 1997: 638]. 
Traditionally, according Oromo customs, land is not a commodity for sale or transfer to non-
kin.  This is what most of my informants claimed when asked for their opinion on land sale 
issues.  Arsii elders claim that selling one’s ancestral land—kosii abba ufi i gurguru—is considered 
immoral, and if it occurs, it is a sign of ‘disorder’ in the family concerned.  The sale of land could 
occur, however, in the case of extreme poverty when there is no other option available to sustain 
a family.  Otherwise, a land seller is perceived as an extravagant and lazy person without a vision 
for his descendants’ future, lacking respect for his ancestors.
Seen from the point of view of Oromo descent organizations and settlement patterns, selling 
land to someone beyond close kinship circles causes more troubles to the potential buyer than it 
does to the seller.  In the study area, for instance, settlements are clan-based and the proximity 
of houses and farm fi elds to each other generally indicates descent proximity of the residents. 
Furthermore, the land one holds is usually directly adjacent to the settlement (homestead) itself. 
Consequently, an ‘outsider’1) is often discouraged from buying land or settling in an ‘unwelcoming’ 
neighborhood.  The ‘insider’-‘outsider’ continuum radiates out following the concentric circles of 
descent organization: from family, sub-lineage, lineage and clans to unrelated individuals.
Rural people are aware of both the customary and legal limitations pertaining to land sale. 
Thus, openly selling a piece of land has not been a common phenomenon.  However, neither 
customary norms nor state legislation has exercised absolute control over land sale.  Peasants 
 1) The term ‘outsider’ is used in this paper for an Oromo concept called ambba, which can be used both in its narrower 
and broader meanings.  Its use is highly contextual as the concept can refer to wide-raging relations depending on a 
situation.  In its narrow sense it may refer to a non-family member or to a non-lineage member.  In its broader sense 
it may refer to a non-clan member.  Still in its broadest sense it may refer to non-Oromo.
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have been engaged in manipulating both of the constraints.  This paper demonstrates individual 
interests that induce people to sell, custom-based group interests that serve as a deterrent to 
individual interests, and the strategies individuals employ to deal with both customary and 
legislative constraints on land sale.
2. The Research Area and Methods
Kokossa District is located in southern Ethiopia, in the Bale Zone of Oromia National Regional 
State (Fig. 1).  The district is a highland area with an average altitude of about 2,500 m above sea 
level.  Kokossa was traditionally a predominantly pastoral area.  Historically, small scale barley 
cultivation was practiced.  While enset (Ensete ventricosum) was mainly adopted in the 1940s, 
other crops such as wheat and linseed were introduced in the 1980s.  Currently, livelihoods are 
based on mixed agriculture that combines livestock raising, enset and cereal crops cultivation, 
in that order of importance.  The Kokossa District Agricultural Development Offi ce claims 
that Kokossa has about 77,020 ha of land, of which over 90 percent is estimated to be used for 
grazing.
The human population of the district is well over 100,000.  The district is inhabited by 
the patrilineal Arsii Oromo people, a branch of the Oromo ethnic group that makes up about 
40 percent of the Ethiopian population.  The settlement pattern is scattered and based on 
Fig. 1.  Map of the Study Area
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patrilineage territories.  Marriage is exogamous, at least at the clan level.  There are a few cases 
whereby people settle among their in-laws, which may appear to contradict the general principle 
of clan based settlements.  Kinship organization of the Arsii Oromo comprises the family 
(mana or warra), sub-lineage (ardaa), lineage (balbbala) and clan (gosa) in an ascending order. 
Although land is legally owned by the government, each household makes decisions on how to 
use the land under its control.  Arbitrary inter-clan settlement is frequently resisted.
This study was conducted as a part of my Ph.D. research between 1999 and 2004.  The 
data were continuously updated through successive fi eld trips.  The last fi eldwork was conducted 
in August-September 2004, and November 2005.  Unstructured interviews, observations and 
collection of copies of written land transactions have been the major sources of information. 
Detailed studies of particular cases were also conducted.  Illicit as it is, securing information 
on land transaction, particularly gaining access to copies of informal records was not an easy 
task.  As a native of the study area, in most cases I used personal networks including the people 
involved in such transactions to secure copies of the documents and to conduct background 
studies of each case of land transaction.
Many of the informants agreed to show me their documents, allowed me to read and 
take a notes from them.  They also provided me with the background stories of the cases in an 
unstructured interview setting.  However, many of them declined my request to take the papers 
away in order to make photocopies in the nearby towns.  To a large extent, these papers appear 
similar in their formats and the disguised phrases and words they employ.  Copies of the deals 
that I was allowed to make photocopies of, are presented in this paper, followed by translation 
and analysis.  These copies and translations can provide us with a fairly representative sample of 
the most common types of disguised land transactions.
3. Land Related Transactions
Despite what the people claim and government legislation dictates, land sale under different 
disguises and in a variety of forms does exist.  Land transactions can be conducted in writing 
or orally.  The choice between either option depends on several factors.  The social relationship 
between the parties engaged in a land sale, which infl uences the level of confi dence and trust 
between them, the size of land and the amount of cash involved, are prominent among the major 
factors.  When the sellers and the buyers are distant relatives or non-kin, or when the land is 
large and the money paid for it happens to be large, the agreement tends to be written.  However, 
whether the deal is based on a written or oral agreement, the phrase ‘land sale’ (lafa gurguruu) 
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is carefully avoided and replaced by such words crafted as ‘contract,’ ‘gift’ or ‘land exchange.’ 
In all cases, respected members of the community from both sides are called upon to witness the 
transaction and the agreements on which the transaction is based.
Currently, there are two major types of land-related transactions operating in the study area. 
These are locally known as marga gurguruu, literally ‘grass sale’ which I prefer to refer to as 
‘grazing rights sale’; and lafa gurguruu, or land sale in its proper sense.  Most of the discussion in 
this paper deals with various forms of land sale practices.  However, a brief overview of grazing 
rights sale is needed to demonstrate that other options for land sale do also exist.
3.1 Grazing Rights Sale
Grazing rights sale involves a transfer of grazing rights over a given plot of land for a certain 
amount of cash and for a specifi ed period of time.  Grazing rights sale is a routine practice in the 
study area and unlike land sale, there is no specifi c government-based regulation that permits or 
prohibits the practice.  The practice appears to be a local innovation emerging from the needs 
of diverse sources.  The profi le of the people who sold grazing rights showed that most of them 
were livestock-poor peasants who possessed more land than they needed for the grazing of 
their own cattle.  On the other hand, their clients were livestock-rich households who possessed 
more livestock than their own land could support.  These households purchased pasture from 
livestock-poor farmers who owned enclosed or fenced lands which were well managed to 
grow good quality grasses.  The practice has become so common that some of the families I 
interviewed have established grazing rights sale as an essential element of their livelihood.  The 
land sellers and land buyers thus have established vital symbiotic relationships out of their 
respective needs.
The contract period varied from case to case.  It could be as short as two months or as long 
as a twelve months (Table 1).  A person may purchase a grazing right for a year and manage the 
grass himself for use in different seasons, depending upon the size of the land and the number of 
livestock to be grazed at a time.  Prices of a pasture per unit of land area also varied according to 
a number of factors.  The quality of the grass, judged on the basis of the local land classifi cation 
and the grass species that dominates a land—such as araddaa,2) wiixaa,3) and ciienaa/caffaa4)—
greatly infl uenced the price.  Aradaa and wiixaa lands, or a mixture of these two types, are 
 2) Araddaa is a land usually around settlements and well fertilized through the rotation of cattle kraal, and its grass 
species dominated by Coqorssa (Eleusine jaegeri) and Alandu (Cyperus papyrus).
 3) Wiixaa (Hyparrhenia rufa) dominates well drained land which is not disturbed by cattle kraal or which is not 
converted into farm fi elds.
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locally preferred and fetch better prices than ciienaa and caffaa lands.5)  Another factor that 
infl uenced the price of pastures was the rapport established between the ‘landowner’ and his 
‘tenant.’6)  In the course of the fi eldwork, I observed several interesting cases whereby peasants 
sold grazing rights over the same size and similar quality of pasture at signifi cantly different 
prices to different individuals at different times (see Table 1).  This is mainly the result of a 
mutual relationship that has been established between a ‘landowner’ and his ‘regular tenant,’ or 
of kinship proximity between the parties.
Prices of grazing right per hectare of land ranged from as low as Birr7) 3 to as high as Birr 






Price (Birr) Price/ha. month
Grass type 
(local land classifi cation)
Year of sale
A-1 1  7 150 21.42 wiixaa, araddaa 1999
A-2 1  7 130 18.57 wiixaa, araddaa 2000/2001
A-3 1  6  60 10.00 wiixaa, araddaa 2002/2003
B-1 1/2  6  70 23.33 araddaa 2000
B-2 1/2  6  60 20.00 araddaa 2001/2002
C-1 1 12 150 12.50 araddaa 2000/2001
C-2 1  5  80 16.00 araddaa 2001
C-3 1 11 120 10.90 araddaa 2002/2003
D 1  7  80 11.42 wiixaa 2001
E 1  7  90 12.85 wiixaa, araddaa 2000/2001
F 1  6  45  7.50 wiixaa, araddaa 2001
G 1/2 12  90 15.00 wiixaa 2001/2002
H 1/2  4  60 30.00 maasaa midhaan, irra bade 2001
I 1/2  2  60 60.00 araddaa 2002
J 1  2 100 50.00 ciienaa, araddaa 2002
K-1 5 12 200  3.33 wiixaa, araddaa 2000/2001
K-2 5 12 200  3.33 wiixaa, araddaa 2002/2003
L 3/4  4  50 16.66 wiixaa, caffaa 2002
M 1/4  6  30 20.00 araddaa 2001/2002
Source: Field research, 2001, 2002.
Note:  Cases A, B, C, and K had sold grazing rights over the lands in different seasons/years either to the same 
or different clients.
 4) Caffaa/ciienaa (Cyperus dichostachyus) dominates water-logging lands.  This grass type is not preferred, particularly 
during the rainy season, as it can be easily damaged by livestock hooves thereby reducing the length of time to be 
grazed.
 5) For more Oromo names of the plants species mentioned, see [Kelecha 1980].
 6) ‘Landlord’-‘tenant’ relations should not imply that the landlord is better off than his tenant in terms of wealth and 
in view of the local perception of the poor and the rich.  Indeed, the tenants are considered richer by local standards 
because they usually possess more livestock than their landlords.
 7) Birr is a unit of Ethiopian currency.  At offi cial exchange rate Birr 8.69=1 USD
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50 (Table 1).  Without suffi cient explanation, this gap appears to be too big to comprehend. 
Beyond the size of the land and the quality of the grass and the social relationship between the 
buyers and the sellers, as well as other specifi c agreements between the parties, infl uenced the 
price.  For example, Case K in Table 1 sold grazing rights over 5 ha of land for only Birr 200 for 
one year, which calculates to slightly over Birr 3.33 per hectare per month.  This appears to be 
the cheapest deal from among the cases.  A careful examination of this grazing right sale revealed 
that other factors were involved beyond the mere business deal.  I found out that the seller had 
reserved full grazing rights over the same land for the fi ve heads of cattle he owned.  The parties 
also agreed that the buyer would use the seller’s cattle kraal and by implication fertilizes the land. 
Furthermore, the seller and the buyer are from the same clan which also played a part in the 
lowering of the price.
The involvement of these non-market forces in grazing rights sales makes it diffi cult to argue 
whether the value of grass per unit of land is increasing or decreasing.  Nevertheless, from the 
perception of the local people and from my observation of intense competition among peasants 
over grazing rights purchase, one can assert that the demand for pastures is increasing.  This 
claim can also be supported by two cases that involved disputes over grazing rights transactions. 
In both cases the landholders sold grazing rights over the same land to two different clients 
simultaneously.  In both cases the second buyers knew that grazing rights over these lands were 
already sold, but they desperately needed the grass and offered better prices than the initial 
buyers had paid.
Grazing is a predominant land use pattern in the area.  The progressive shrinking of 
‘communal’ grazing lands and the declining land per household might have caused the increasing 
demand for grazing rights purchases.  The presence of a huge livestock population defi nitely 
drives up the demand for grazing land.  In a district of slightly over 77,000 ha in area, there were 
over 500,000 livestock, mainly cattle, horses, sheep and goats [ABRDP 1999: 44].  Since land 
ownership and cattle ownership may not correlate, vital symbiotic relationships emerge between 
the people owning different resources needed by each party.
Beyond this, selling the ‘grass’ can be conceived of as a strategy to solving a number of 
problems.  The practice could help a landholder meet his immediate needs without risking 
permanent loss of the land, as in the case when he might be forced to dispose it.  Some of the 
lands sold for grazing in my case studies were suitable for cultivation, too, but the landholders 
did not own the oxen needed to engage in cultivation.  Other lands were steep slopes or seasonally 
water-logged lands which were not suitable for cultivation.  Grazing rights sale could help 
Asian and African Area Studies, 6 (2)
360
improve both limitations.  It could also be viewed as dealing with the limits imposed on land sale 
by local customs and State policies.  Thus selling the grass, not the land itself, can be conceived 
of as an adaptive strategy to a number of limitations faced by landholders.
3.2 Land Sale
A survey conducted on the means of land acquisition in the study area [Hebo 2006] produced 
multiple means of land acquisition (Table 2).  Among these multiple means, land acquisition by 
purchase appeared interesting as the practice has offi cially been considered illegal.  Although 
I knew since 1999 when I started research in Southern Ethiopia that some people sold land, 
it was this survey that provided me with concrete information.  Out of 100 household heads 
interviewed, 8 acquired land through purchase or a combination of purchase and other means 
of land acquisition.  Although this fi gure is not signifi cant compared with other means of land 
acquisitions, it revealed the existence of the practice amid an offi cial ban on it.  However, I did 
not pay much attention to land sale practices at this stage of the research since my focus was on 
the identifi cation of multiple means of land acquisitions.  It was in my subsequent fi eld trips that 
my interest in land transactions took shape.
Given that clandestine land transactions exit, my particular interest was oriented towards 
written land transactions.  Similar dubious informal records of land sales by peasants are 
well documented and analyzed for some other parts of Africa [Benjaminsen and Lund 2003; 
Mathieu et al. 2003; Andrè 2003; Lavigne Delville 2003].  However, this dimension of land 
related research is lacking in Ethiopia, to the best of my knowledge.  The covert contracts people 
undertake, the types of lands which are susceptible for disposal, kinship relationship between the 
people who frequently engage in land transaction, and strategies people employ to circumvent 
Table 2.  Means of Land Acquisition by 100 Households Heads




Inheritance & land distribution  26
Land distribution  10
Inheritance & purchase   5
Gift   3
Inheritance, land distribution & purchase   2
Inheritance & gift   1
Purchase   1
Total 100
Source: [Hebo 2006: 66]
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the State, as well as the customary constraints, have hardly been discussed.
In what follows, the paper analyzes cases of written land transaction in conjunction with 
detailed background studies.  The background studies were necessary because, without such 
studies, only a part of reality would be gleaned from the records alone.  Written land transactions 
were deliberately left vague and employed ambiguous statements or even recorded substantively 
different stories from the ones agreed upon between the parties involved.
Peasants have adopted a number of innovative ways of dealing with prohibitions placed 
on land sale and land transfer.  Probably one of the most paradoxical of these innovations is 
the informal recording of land transactions.  It appears paradoxical because peasants seem to 
attempt to legalize an illegal activity or formalize an informal deal.  Taken literally these written 
papers look like formal agreements.  Closer analyses, when combined with careful background 
studies of these deals, provide immense information on the manipulations, misinformation, and 
deliberate omissions of certain terms or the use of disguised arrangements.
Currently there are three major ways through which people could undertake disguised land 
sale.  First, people may claim to have sold property such as perennial crops and planted trees. 
Land, however, is not mentioned but can only be implied.  Second, people engage in disguised 
land sale contracts, locally known as kontraata.  Again land is not directly mentioned but takes 
on a different ‘identity,’ and is mentioned as a farm fi eld.  These two ways are practiced either 
alongside each other or separately.  In both cases, transactions are struck either in the presence 
of some witnesses by way of oral agreements or through informal recording of the transaction 
which contains signatures of the seller and the buyer as well as by witnesses.
Third, land can be sold disguised in what is known as ‘land exchange,’ whereby individuals 
claim to have swapped lands.  Land exchange, in its formal sense, is an activity offi cially 
encouraged to reduce farm fragmentation.  However, the same system is being employed to 
undertake clandestine land sale.  In the following discussions I will analyze samples of some 
written agreements of disguised land sales.  Three informative case studies will reveal how the 
system works and the complexities and innovations involved in land transactions.
a) ‘Contracting out fields’ for unknown duration and selling perennials as they stand: 
Complexities involved in disguised land sale8)
The following case of disguised land sale ‘contract’ and the sale of crops and trees on the land 
may illuminate on how the systems I mentioned above actually operate.
 8) This case was preliminarily discussed in [Hebo 2006: 68-70].
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Date: July 12, 2000
I, [name withheld and abbreviated as Mr. D],9) who resides in Bokore PA,10) have sold bamboo 
trees and 46 eucalyptus trees, which I have planted in my kaloo (fence or fenced land) to him 
[Mr. H].  I also sold my enset plants on my maasaa (farm fi eld) to him.  And also, I granted 
my maasaa on kontraata (lease or contract) to him [Mr. H].  In return I received Birr 500 from 
him.  I hereby confi rm the above statements by my signature in the presence of witnesses....
This land sale took place between two individuals (hereinafter Mr. D and Mr. H).11)  They 
belong to different clans (gosa) while the land at the center of the deal is located within Mr. H’s 
gosa territory.  This land was allocated to Mr. D in the mid-1980s by the then Tulu Gaduda 
PA administration.  Mr. D had fenced the land and planted bamboo and eucalyptus trees on it, 
marking all the boundaries of the fence.  He also planted some enset crop but most of it was 
already harvested by 2000.  He had been using most part of the former enset fi eld as a barley 
fi eld (maasaa garbu’u).
Being a resident in the territory of a clan to which he did not belong, Mr. D claimed that 
he was not leading a peaceful life.  He claimed that his ollaa (neighbors) had been intimidating 
him ever since he settled on the land.  The intimidation was intensifi ed after the downfall 
of the Derg,12) which fi nally forced him to sell the land and move to his lineage territory. 
Nevertheless, he had to conduct the land sale within the context of what could be acceptable 
to the government structures.  Disguised land sale contract is one of these possible strategies to 
make the deal appear legal, as the translation and analysis of the agreement revealed.  The buyer, 
the seller and the three witnesses at the scene confi rmed the agreement by putting their signature 
(fi ngerprints) on the piece of paper.  The parties made intricate transactions and concluded 
on these simple handwritten informal notes.  However, the text lacks many elements of a 
formal deal.13)
 9) All individuals involved in land sale practices of the cases presented in this paper are referred to by the initials of 
their fi rst names.
 10) PA (Peasants’ Association) is the lowest level in the hierarchy of government administrative structures in Ethiopia.
 11) It is not always easy to obtain copies of these informal recordings of land transactions.  Paradoxical as it may seem, 
the parties who record the deal to apparently formalize it actually keep it informal when they decline to share the 
piece of paper on which they put their words and signatures.  I used personal relations with respondent to obtain 
materials both to read and take a note.  In this particular case Mr. H allowed me to read and take a note from a 
copy of the agreement.
 12) Derg was the military regime (1974-1991) that deposed the imperial regime in 1974, and ruled Ethiopia under the 
banner of socialism.
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The three major elements in the deal, that is, the trees surrounding the farm fi eld, the enset 
plants on a part of the farm fi eld, and the farm fi eld itself could all be controversial depending 
on how one treats them.  All these elements could have implicit allusions.  First, bamboo is a 
naturally fast multiplying plant.  It can also be easily transplanted and spread over a wider area 
to claim more land in a short period of time.  In the text, however, its number was not indicated 
while the number of eucalyptus trees was clearly stated.  Selling eucalyptus as standing/living 
trees is another problematic point.  Eucalyptus stumps regenerate after the mature trees are 
harvested, which means a person may use the same land for decades tending the trees on it. 
Above all, there is no indication in this informal record as to where the land planted by trees 
ends and where the farm fi eld begins.  In sum, it was not stated or even indicated whether 
the buyer would harvest the trees and vacate the land or he would use the land as long as the 
bamboo and eucalyptus trees exist on it.
Enset is another problematic crop as far as landownership is concerned.  The plant is 
perennial and it takes almost a decade to fully mature in this cool highland area.  Furthermore, 
an enset fi eld can be kept functioning for decades, since inter-planting younger enset is possible 
without completely harvesting the mature ones.  However, in this informal written material, 
this was not mentioned.  Third, and perhaps the most important is that no period (duration) of 
‘contract’ was specifi ed on the piece of paper.  Mr. D only said he gave his maasaa—farm fi eld 
as opposed to the land—on ‘contract’ to Mr. H.  Nothing was stated as to when the ‘contract’ 
would end.  Here Mr. D carefully avoided the use of two important words: (1) sale (which was 
replaced by ‘given on contract,’ and (2) land (supplanted by maasaa or farm fi eld).  Moreover, 
Mr. D just had recorded that he received Birr 500, from which one could hardly understand the 
particular value of each of the three elements included in the record; that is, the farm fi eld, the 
enset crop and the trees.
Several points need further analysis in this case.  At this juncture, I focus on the following 
two points.  (1) Why was the record in the case above deliberately written in such vague 
language and why did the parties fail to put on paper some important aspects of the deal? (2) 
Why do people tend to sell the land they acquire through land redistribution?
Emphasis on the farm fi eld and plants, rather than the land itself, and a focus on the 
contract instead of sale were all deliberately introduced in order to ‘adhere’ to State policies.  The 
 13) Mathieu et al. [2003], presents a very interesting analysis of similar land transactions activities and subsequent 
informal recordings, drawing their cases from Burkina Faso.  They note how peasants deliberately avoid certain 
elements of the deal from recording.
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parties in this deal knew that land sale is illegal.  At the same time they wanted to semi-legalize 
their deal, which appears paradoxical.  But the whole idea of such an informal recording was not 
to legalize the transaction as such.  Nor was it intended to protect the buyer from a breach of 
the contract by the seller.  Breach of contracts could be better protected by the local people who 
were at the scene when the transaction took place than the paper itself.  The paper is intended 
to give some protection to both the seller and the buyer against the possible threat from the PA 
administration.  And avoiding such phrase as ‘land sale,’ and not putting the duration of the 
‘contract’ on paper could leave some windows for both the buyer and the seller should they need 
to negotiate with the PA administration.
This case and several other cases I observed throughout the fi eldwork period revealed that 
selling land that had been acquired by inheritance appeared to be very infrequent.  A few people 
who sold the land they inherited did so to those in the family circles, not to ‘outsiders.’  Almost 
all confi rmed land sale cases and interviews with farmers disclosed that: (1) people tended to sell 
the land they received through formal/informal land redistribution, particularly when they were 
given the land which did not belong to their own lineage; and (2) people tended to sell the land 
they obtained through land distribution to those who claimed customary ownership over the 
same land.  This may arise from two sources of insecurity.  On the one hand, individuals who 
received land outside of their lineage territory or in an ‘unwelcoming’ neighborhood would feel 
insecure because of actual or potential intimidations and threats from those who would claim 
customary rights over the land.  On the other hand, formal channels through which a person 
may acquire a piece of land lack continuity and stability.  As a result these channels would not 
be able to provide sustainable security and protection to those people who received land through 
them.
b) ‘Exchanging lands’ for no apparent reason?
The following case presents another form of land sale; this time disguised as the ‘exchange of 
lands.’  This, as is the case with ‘contract,’ is an attempt to make a land sale activity closer in 
appearance, though not in content, to what is offi cially permitted or accepted.  Land exchange in 
its real sense is encouraged by the government.  The aim is to help peasants consolidate scattered 
farms and/or holdings.  It is within this framework that peasants have found a legal loophole to 
sell land disguised as land exchange.  The written agreements that confi rm these ‘land exchanges’ 
contain a number of ambiguous statements and phrases.  They also make the government a party 
to such informal written deals.  I shall provide a verbatim translation of such an informal written 
document with a detailed analysis.  Before that a background of this case is in order, as it offers 
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insights into a web of interests in land and the role of local social organization in infl uencing the 
direction land sale should take.
Mr. R was allocated land which belonged to his cousin, Mr. G, by a Peasants’ Association 
(Fig. 2).  He had been using the land for cereal crop cultivation.  In late 2004, Mr. R attempted 
to sell this land to a person of the same clan as himself but of a different lineage.  This caused 
uproar among Mr. R’s close relatives, who are also Mr. G’s relatives, who ‘cursed’ him for 
trying to transfer the land to an ‘outsider.’  In the meantime, Mr. D, a nephew of the original 
land owner (Mr. G) had confronted the potential buyer and warned him not to venture into 
this ‘dangerous business’ and to refrain from buying ‘family land.’  This strategic intimidation 
of the potential buyer thus slowed down the negotiations.  At the same time, Mr. R’s relatives 
convinced him to refrain from attempting to transfer the land to an ‘outsider.’  They urged him 
not to sell the land but to a close relative.  Mr. D was a close relative who offered to buy the 
land.  Mr. D claimed that he offered to buy the land in order to ‘protect the honor of the family, 
and to protect it from being transferred to an outsider.’
In order to make this transaction appear ‘legal,’ however, the deal had to be written not as a 
land sale but as a ‘land exchange.’  The deal claims that Mr. R transferred land to Mr. D who in 
turn transferred another piece of land in exchange.  It was indicated in the paper that Mr. R and 
Mr. D were neighbors and had adjacent pieces of land.  However, the land Mr. R transferred to 
Mr. D was actually equally distant from both parties.  The only difference was that the land at the 
center of the deal was closer to and a part of Mr. D’s paternal uncle’s land, that is, Mr. G (Fig. 2).
This agreement of land transaction, as many of the land transactions in this area tend to 
Fig. 2.  Kinship Relations of the Individuals Engaged in the Disguised Land Sale
G: Original owner of the land, R: Allocated the land via PA, and later sold the land disguise land exchange, 
D: Bought the land disguise land exchange
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do, gives some appearances of being a formal deal.  This document, called ‘an agreement of 
land exchange,’ contained the date recorded in the Ethiopian calendar 1997-3-3 (November 12, 
2004); names and signatures of the parties engaged in the agreement and of the witnesses as well; 
details of the land such as the size, location and boundaries in all directions; and the amount 
of money involved and obligations that the parties entered into, indicating as to what would 
happen in case any of them fails to abide by the agreement.
The title of this agreement clearly indicates that the parties engaged in a ‘land exchange.’ 
The boundaries of the exchanged lands were clearly indicated either in terms of physical features 
or as being bounded by the neighboring fi elds whose owners’ names were mentioned in the 
paper.  The size of the lands was also indicated in a local measurement.  Those who signed 
the deal as ‘observers’ were consistently referred to in the text as ‘local elders present’ not as 
‘witnesses.’  The implication is that these ‘local elders’ are considered as the guardians of such an 
agreement, preventing either party from breaking the agreement, rather than being witnesses in 
its formal sense.  The paper, however, contains some vague and ambiguous elements and some 
omissions.  The money involved in the exchange was not suffi ciently explained, for instance. 
It was simply stated that it was paid to balance the differences in the size of the ‘exchanged 
lands’ and nothing was mentioned about the quality of the land, which could make a difference. 
While Mr. R’s land was registered as a mainly farm fi eld (maasaa), Mr. D’s land use type was not 
indicated.
The most important omission was that no explanation was given as to why the parties 
agreed to balance the difference in cash where Mr. D had suffi cient land to fully compensate Mr. 
R in exchange.  Another important omission was that, the reason for the parties engagement 
in ‘land exchange’ was not indicated anywhere in the agreement.  These omissions could have 
implications for the deal’s capacity to be a formal and binding one.  In this agreement it is 
explicitly stated that Mr. R and Mr. D are neighbours and they share land boundaries.  Mr. D 
transferred the two timad of land to Mr. R’s land along their common boundary, whereas the 
land Mr. R transferred to Mr. D is equally distant from the residences of both individuals.  This 
may defy the government’s objectives for allowing land exchange.
Thus, taken literally this ‘land exchange’ happened for no apparent reasons.  It is only a 
closer review of the background, beyond the written document, that reveals the true nature of 
such a deal.  The two individuals engaged in a complete business transaction, in that the value of 
the land was negotiated and the money was accordingly transferred.  But that was not acceptable 
from the point of view of the government’s policy.  Thus, the agreement (an informal record) 
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Fig. 3.  A Copy of ‘Land Exchange’ Disguised Land Sale Agreement
Date: 3/3/97 Ethiopian calendar [November 12, 2004]
We, Mr. R and Mrs. W [a man and his wife, hereinafter Mr. R], have agreed to exchange our private 
farm fi eld and a plot of uncultivated land which measures fi ve timad* [about 1.25 ha], with a land which 
belonged to Mr. D and Mrs. S [a man and his wife, hereinafter Mr. D] that measures two timad....  Mr. 
D compensated Birr 1,600 to Mr. R since the latter’s land is larger by three timad... We [both parties] 
agreed to the exchange of the lands and the compensation in cash for the difference in the size of the 
lands, and conducted our agreements in the presence of local elders.  We made marks on the lands [that 
we have exchanged] to indicate the boundaries along all directions.  If we, [Mr. R and Mrs. W] break 
this agreement, we will pay a fi ne of Birr 500 to the government through the district fi nance offi ce.  And 
we agreed to be charged as swindlers.  We also agreed to pay back the money we received from Mr. D. 
The interest on the money will be worked out based on the situation of local business conditions.  We, 
[Mr. D and Mrs. S], also agreed that if we break this agreement we will vacate the land and return it to 
its owners....  We also agreed to pay a fi ne of Birr 500 to the government through the district fi nance 
offi ce in case we break this agreement.  We [both parties] agreed on what is written above and signed 
this agreement with our free will and full understanding in the presence of local elders (emphasis added).
        Present signatures of those entered into agreement
 * Timad literally refers to a pair of oxen, and also used as a unit of land measurement.  A timad of land is a size of 
land that can be farmed with a pair of oxen a day.  Four timad is equivalent to one hectare.
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had to be made in a completely different manner and the deal was written as a ‘land exchange.’ 
Moreover, Mr. D had to make a symbolic land transfer to Mr. R.  The land was of inferior 
quality compared to Mr. R’s but the size of the land as mentioned in the agreement appeared to 
be true.
The inclusion of an unrepresented party (the government) in their agreement is another 
interesting element of this deal.  The amount of fi ne to be paid to the government in the case of a 
breach of the agreement by either of the parties was explicitly stated along with the name of an 
offi ce where that money would be deposited.  These and other overtly legal words and phrases 
are directed at the government structures and intended to make the deal appear legal.  It appears 
that the parties tried to appease the government’s structures, particularly the PA leaders and 
district offi cials, by employing ‘formal’ words for the informal practices they undertook.
This land transaction also revealed other complexities involved in land tenure in this area. 
It indicates that land is so valuable that it can even tempt close kin into using a government 
structure to grab land from one another.  Mr. R gained the land which belonged to his cousin 
by employing PA administration.  At the same time, the case revealed the power of kin to keep 
the land within the inner kinship circle, even when that means buying the land from a ‘corrupt’ 
member who is predisposed to transfer the land to whoever can pay for it.  This and other case 
studies and interviews with the local people suggest that kinship based organization, particularly 
extended families and sub-lineages, have more power than the local government offi cials in 
deterring land sale to some degrees and in infl uencing the direction land sale should take when 
they occur.
We have seen in this case that relatives of the land seller had the power to intimidate and 
deter an ‘outsider’ buyer and infl uenced the seller to transfer the land to an acceptable ‘insider.’ 
This is reinforced by the settlement pattern whereby a man at one’s doorsteps is most likely 
to be the closest related person.  The government structures and policies are usually subject to 
manipulations and maneuvering by the peasants who have never been a part of the processes 
of formulating the policies, and where state structures at all levels represent the state not the 
peasants.
c) ‘Handing over the land/returning the land to the state’ but receiving money
The third disguised land sale, which happened between the same individuals I presented above, 
discloses more complexities that develop around the land.
Only ten months had elapsed since Mr. R and Mr. D entered into the agreement discussed 
above.  Mr. R was again rumored as negotiating with the same person to whom he attempted to 
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sell the land discussed earlier to sell the two timad of land he received in a ‘land exchange’ from 
Mr. D.  On hearing this rumor, Mr. D was reportedly so upset that he was ready to physically 
engage Mr. R.  The problem with this plot of land is that it is located between Mr. R’s and Mr. 
D’s homestead.  If Mr. D did not act, an ‘outsider’ with whom he was not on good terms after 
their confrontation on the previous land sale case would hold land at his doorstep.  This would 
be a recipe for confl ict.  Mr. D also mentioned to me that he explicitly told Mr. K, who was 
Date: 11/12/97 Ethiopian calendar [August 17, 2005]
We, [Mr. R and Mrs. W], have returned the land to Mr. D, which we had received earlier in land 
exchange with him.  We gave him this land for ever and received Birr 600 in return.  We did this in the 
presence of local elders.  Any of us who may break this agreement, either the one who returned the land 
to the government [reverted to the public pool] or the one who received the possession of land will be 
fi ned with Birr 300 [to the government].  Any of us who breaks this agreement compensates the injured 
by paying double the amount of money we have received and its interest being calculated based on the 
local business circumstances.  We [both parties] have signed this agreement on our free will (emphases 
added).
Present signature of those ‘who handed over’ [the land] signature of the ‘receiver’ [of the land]
Fig. 4.  A Copy of Disguised Land Sale Agreement
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negotiating to purchase the land, that ‘he should buy such a land if he wants to put himself 
in endless trouble.’ Mr. K again backed down and his negotiation with Mr. R was stalled. 
Subsequent intervention by the sub-lineage to which both Mr. R and Mr. D belong convinced Mr. 
R to sell the land to Mr. D again.
Mr. D claimed to have every right to buy such a piece of land since he is a closer relative 
of Mr. R and since the land at the center of controversy originally belonged to himself. 
Consequently, the agreement was concluded in the spirit of these negotiations.  Nevertheless, 
the paper signed by the two parties and by four local ‘elders,’ three of whom also observed the 
previous agreement of ‘land exchange,’ was written, as usual, in a completely different spirit and 
contained a number of disguises and ambiguities.
This deal was simply entitled ‘agreement.’  Nevertheless, there are some fundamental 
omissions and differences when compared to the former agreement that took place between 
the same individuals.  While in the fi rst agreement there were 8 local ‘elders’ who witnessed 
the agreement, in the subsequent case there were only four people, three of whom were also 
witnesses of the former agreement.  In this agreement two confl icting statements are evident.  On 
the one hand, Mr. R and Mrs. W claimed that they returned, indicating no sale, the land to Mr. 
D.  Yet they received Birr 600 in return.  The ‘return’ of the land was recorded as permanent. 
On the other had, it has been indicated that Mr. R released the land for the government (reverted 
it to the status of public property).  In this case it appeared that Mr. D just received the land as a 
trustee of the public, or on behalf of the state.  This defi es the fi rst statement and contradicts the 
point of receiving money for such a practice.  As was in the preceding case, the parties made the 
government a party to their agreement, and agreed to be fi ned Birr 300 and transfer the money 
to the government.
This case supports the major arguments I have made regarding the cases discussed earlier. 
Here again, the intervention and the power of kin groups in infl uencing land sale is apparent. 
The disguises and ambiguous statements used in this case add only to the evidences of innovation 
and strategies that peasants employ to deal with constraints on land sale, particularly those 
stemming from government legislation and policy.
4. Conclusions
The case study material and associated discussion presented in this paper shed some important 
light on the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between the people who possess different 
resources—between land owners and cattle owners—that have given rise to a thriving mechanism 
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for grazing rights sale.  This relationship is shaped around the land whereby landownership 
and cattle ownership may not necessarily correlate.  Divergent needs have brought about the 
establishment of ‘patron-client’ relationships whereby landowners, though poor from the local 
perspective, act as patrons to large livestock owners (locally considered rich) who appear as 
clients.  This relationship is a reverse of the traditional perceptions of and relationships between 
the poor and the rich.  Land is emerging, thus, a medium that breaks the traditional perception 
of and relationships between the haves and the have-nots.
Evidence presented in this paper reveal that merely the presence of policies and legislation 
that prohibit the sale of land may not guarantee the suppression of land transactions.  Peasants 
have circumvented and maneuvered those policies in order to undertake land transaction.  Such 
adaptive strategies as disguised land sales by claming to have sold plants (crops) and trees, to 
have transferred ‘farm fi elds on contract (kontraata), and claims such as land exchange, and 
grazing rights sale constitute some of the ways to transfer land without risking the actions of 
government structures.
The written agreements that people engage in are found to be innovative ways to keep the 
government policies and legislations at arm’s length.  The ambiguous concepts employed in these 
written materials and the attempts to introduce different stories than the ones agreed upon were 
all designed to beat the state systems.  The agreement itself may be protected more by the local 
elders and local customs than the papers themselves.
The paper also demonstrated that there exist competing jurisdictions, norms and 
organization (local versus state) that influence the possession of land, its transfers, and 
transactions at various levels.  The power of local social organization in deterring land sale or 
in infl uencing its direction was found to be signifi cant, as compared to government structures. 
In essence, local social organization, particularly members of the extended families and sub-
lineages, have a strong say not in baring land sale as such but in infl uencing to whom it should 
be sold or who should have preference in buying a given piece of land.  This priority access is 
determined not by the ability to pay, but by the customary rights (social stake) one may claim 
over land.  Thus, families and minimal lineages have strong say in infl uencing the direction of 
land sale.  In so doing, they manage to keep the land within ‘acceptable’ circles of kin groups.
Still we could also deduce from these case studies, that land rights obtained via government 
structures tend to be unstable and susceptible to various forms of transactions.  People tend to 
sell the land they occupied or were given through the PA administration.  Such land is sold not 
to anyone offering the best price, but to the original owners who claim custom-enforced priority 
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over it.  Understanding of these complexities and interests involved in the land are vital to 
successful and fruitful debates, policies and legislation pertaining to land.
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